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The incentive mechanism of Top Management Team (TMT) in China has drawn 
a lot of attention from far and near. Based on Agency Cost theory, this article 
examines the forms and characteristics of China’s TMT incentive mechanism. With 
data from more than 1400 China’s publicly listed firms, this paper conducts an 
empirical study of the relationship between 1) sum of TMT’s payment and firm’s 
performance and 2) percentage of TMT’s firm shares and firm’s performance. The 
empirical result shows: 1) sum of TMY’s payment is positively related to firm’s 
performance; 2) the percentage of TMT’s firm shares is positively related to firm’s 
performance. At the same time, by dividing sum of TMT’s payment and percentage of 
TMT’s shares into different levels, it also finds that the higher the level of TMT’s 
payment is, the stronger is its relationship with firm’s performance; On the contrary, 
the increase of percentage of TMT’s shares isn’t necessarily followed with the 
increase of firm’s performance. It takes on an irregular moving trend. Furthermore, 
TMT’s payment incentive mechanism has a stronger positive relationship with firm’s 
performance than that of TMT’s share incentive mechanism in China. It also proves 
the fact from another aspect that TMT’s payment is playing a main role in China’s 
TMT incentive mechanisms, whereas the percentage of TMT’s shares relatively plays 
a smaller part in inspiring the top management team in China.  
 
The last part of the article concludes and gives some suggestions. The publicly 
listed firms need to improve TMT incentive mechanism in China. They should 
gradually increase the role of share incentives and implement both spiritual incentive 
and physical incentives so that a multi-level, multi-faceted incentive mechanism can 
be established. At the same time, we can further promote the diversity and efficiency 
of TMT incentive mechanism by nurturing healthy manager market and capital 
market, establishing a sound restraint mechanism and improving relevant laws and 














This study has deepened our insights towards the relationship between TMT’s 
incentive mechanism and firm’s performance among China’s publicly listed firms. By 
conducting a study on the relationship between China’s TMT incentive mechanism 
and firm’s performance based on a multi-level empirical test, it also helps to filled in 
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Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) [1], Murphy (1985) [2]的研究表明：公司治
理对企业业绩有显著的影响。 
经过 30 年来不断探索，中国的企业已经逐渐认识到公司治理是中国企业改
























































    上市公司作为我国国有企业改制的“领头羊”,无论是经营业绩,还是内部的
管理机制都优于其它国有企业,上市公司高管人员激励的现实效果,可以为分析
我国企业内部激励机制提供较有说服力的证据。因此，本文针对以上问题，拟对




























同层次的界定。例如，Hambrick 和 Mason (1984)[4]将高层管理团队界定为“所
有的高级管理人员”，Elron (1997)[5]将高层管理团队界定为那些“从首席执行官
到高级副总裁层次的高级管理人员”，Murray (1989)[6]，Geletkanycz & Hambrick 



















































源于两部门在禀赋回报率上的差别(Blaise M, 2005)[35]。 
国内研究者也力图利用实证结果检验两类企业间是否存在劳动力市场的分




































































第二章  企业高层管理团队及其研究综述 
 6
在 CEO 薪酬与企业业绩关系上，认为二者相关性很小的研究文献有：Jensen 
& Murphy (1994)[41], Hirschey (1989)[42]。在经理人报酬与企业规模关系上，研
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